DJI Consumer Drones Are Still Russian Soldiers’ Favorite

Three years into the war, both sides rely heavily on consumer drones, specifically the Mavic series made by DJI. The Chinese company has publicly deplored any military use of its drones and stopped selling direct to Russia and Ukraine, but despite the ban their drones can easily be bought via third parties.

“Russian soldiers constantly ask for Mavic series quadcopters on Telegram,” Samuel Bendett, an expert on Russian drones and advisor CNA, CNAS and CAIS thinktanks told me. “It’s a constant.”

Bendett points to a Russian source noting they have acquired 100,000 DJI drones in the last eight months, in addition to FPVs assembled in Russia from Chinese parts.

How do consumer drones, not designed for military operations survive in the intense electronic warfare environment in Ukraine? And what lessons can other countries learn from this?

Fiddling With The Firmware

Early on in the conflict, the Russians started using DJI AeroScope devices which pick up the location data sent by every DJI drone as it flies. With AeroScope they could easily spot the drones – and track down their operators. Drone teams often came under fire from artillery even massive Grad rocket bombardments.

Three months in Ukrainians deployed a counter to AeroScope. A black box known as Olga plugs into the drone’s USB connection and installs CIAJeepDoors which disables the drones remote ID signal. (The name is because flying a drone which broadcasts its location is as dangerous as driving a Jeep with no doors).

Olga and similar devices work by hacking into the drone’s firmware. As the name implies, firmware falls between a machine’s fixed hardware and its reprogrammable software. Typically firmware is embedded into a device and is the first thing to fire up to enable the device to function.

In the succeeding years DJI firmware hacks have become steadily more sophisticated and complex. The Russians version is “Firmware 1001”; by June 2024 this was already up to Version 45. The modifications now do a lot more than just make drones invisible to AeroScope

1001 Russian Hacks

Firmware 1001 automatically deactivates the drone’s GPS navigation. This allows it to fly in geofenced ‘no-fly zones’ which would prevent drones operating in areas of Ukraine defined by DJI. This also makes drones immune to GPS spoofing attacks which caused many Russian drones to crash early on in the war. Ther hack removes the height and distance limits on drones, which usually prevent them flying over 400 feet altitude.

Just like a printer that only works with cartridges from the same maker rather than cheap copies, DJI drones only work with DJI batteries. Except that Firmware 1001 disables this check so operators can use non-standard, higher-capacity batteries. This makes a difference to operations: if you spend 10 minutes getting to and from the target then a 40-minute battery only gives you 20 minutes at the target. Upgrading to a 60-minute battery doubles the time over target. However OSINT analyst “Roy” notes that the Russians are complaining about their lack of these high-capacity batteries.

The firmware tweak also boosts power of the transmitter. DJI drones have two communication modes, known as FCC and CE. The high-power FCC mode is legal in the US and Canada, whereas EC is used in most other places where rules on radio interference are stricter. Firmware 1001 enables the ‘illegal’ mode, increasing maximum control range from less than 3 miles for CE to 6 miles with FCC.

Another feature of Firmware 1001 is a setup called “lost_compass” to mitigate jamming. If the drone loses communication with the controller, it automatically ascends and reverses direction. Jamming generally operates at short range – a few hundred meters or less – so this takes it away from the jamming signal and brings it closer to the operator where so a connection can be re-established.

Avoiding The Jam

What the firmware hack cannot change is the drone’s operating frequencies. This makes the DJI drones easier to jam than locally made FPVs which are made with an increasing variety of different frequencies, as well as using frequency-hopping and other techniques to evade jamming.

As mentioned, jamming is mainly short-range, so by staying well back from enemy lines, the drones can keep flying. If they do run into something more serious – like large vehicle-mounted jammers which a range of several miles – they may be in trouble.

However, being lost to jamming is not the same as being shot down, especially if the drone is over friendly territory. When DJI drones lose signal, if they cannot use GPS to return to the launch point, they make a soft landing wherever they are. This means that jammed drones can be retrieved undamaged. Some units now use recovery drones with hooks specifically to retrieve their losses.

Even with all these measures large numbers of Russian consumer-grade drones are likely lost to jamming or other causes. This is why the Russians are fielding them at such a high rate.

‘Mavikski’ Russian Alternatives

In August 2023 the Russians claimed that 2,700 Mavic 3 drones had been ‘flashed’ with Firmware 1001. By August 2024 that had rising to 100,000, and since then they claim another 100,000, showing that the process is taking place on an industrial scale.

“They are used for both ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] and light munition drops,” says Bendett.

Lacking heavier bombers like Ukraine’s Baba Yagas, they Russians also use Mavic-types extensively for laying mines , especially the tiny PFM-1 ‘Petal’ antipersonnel mines.

In some ways it is surprising the Russians are still using DJI drones at all. In America, The Pentagon has banned their use in security reasons and there are now a variety of US.-made alternatives certified for government use under the Blue sUAS initiatives. The catch is that these are significantly more expensive: it will take significant investment (though only the price of one F-35) before anyone in the U.S can match DJI’s vertical integration and economies of scale.

Various Russian manufacturers have announced products resembling DJIs quadcopters, the latest being the Sova-13 made by an outfit that produces FPVs and which has better jamming resistance. But, as with U.S. drones, these are expensive compared to DJI’s efficient mass-proiduction. And, as Bendett notes, the troops want DJIs.

“DJI Mavic is an easy-to-use drone right out of the box,” says Bendett. “It does not take too long to train on and is therefore a solution for many Russian requirements. There is no real replacement for them yet, despite Russian efforts to develop a domestic equivalent.”

As Bendett notes, Russian military fundraisers specifically request DJI Mavics in their requirements. The brand is known and trusted and operators are used to them.

There is perhaps an important lesson here. Many commentors have said that NATO countries should not be rushing to stockpile drones now because they would be obsolete by the time they were needed. However, the fact that years-old non-military drones are extremely useful on the battlefield – with a little firmware hacking – suggests that even old drones can be upgraded. The DJI Mavic 3 dates back to 2021, with the Mavic 3 Pro boasting a powerful Hasselblad camera launched in 2023.

The hacks may may not solve all the security issues, but they provide urgently needed drones which are preferred to Russian military grade alternatives

This does not mean that NATO armies should be buying warehouses full of DJIs. It does mean they should be looking at small, modular upgradable drones and why DJIs have been so effective. And accepting that a stockpile of second-best drones beats no stockpile every time.